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RECENT CASES
its vast bureaucracy. To permit notice of such an opportunity to be
given in a language not understandable to the recipient makes Gold-
berg a pyrrhic victory for the administration of justice. Such pro-
cedures lend support to words of the late Robert F. Kennedy when
he said "there is a reason why the 'poor man looks upon the law
as an enemy . .. For him the law is always taking something
away'."52
JOHN HOLM
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-GUEST STATUTE VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION
OF THE LAW
Plaintiff, an automobile guest, brought a negligence action
against his host to recover for injuries that he suffered when his host's
automobile crossed the center line of a public highway and collided
with an embankment on the opposite side of the road. The trial
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plain-
tiff appealed asserting that the guest statute1 was an unconstitu-
tional denial of equal protection of the law. The Supreme Court of
California, reversing the lower court's decision, held that the guest
statute2 violated the equal protection guarantees of the California
Constitution3 and the United States Constitution because it created
classifications of automobile guests which did not bear a rational
relation to the State's proferred justifications of protection of hospi-
tality and elimination of collusive lawsuits. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.
3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal Rptr. 388 (1973).
According to common law principles, the owner of an automobile
owes a guest the duty to use ordinary care in the operation of an
automobile.5 As hitchhiking became popular during the late 'twenties
and 'thirties, however, state legislatures altered this rule by enacting
52. Wright, Poverty, Minorities, and Respect for Law, 1970 DuKE L.J. 425, 426, citing P.
WALD, LAW AND POvERTY: 1965 at 6 n.13 (1965).
1. CAL. VEH. CODE § 17158 (West 1960):
No person riding in or occuping a vehicle owned by him and driven by another
person with his permission and no person who as a guest accepts a ride In any
vehicle upon a highway without giving compensation for such ride, nor any other
person, has any right of action for civil damages against the driver of the ve-
hicle or against any other person legally liable for the conduct of the driver
on account of personal injury to or the death of the owner or guest during the
ride, unless the plaintiff in any such action establishes that the injury or death
proximately resulted from the intoxication or willful misconduct of the driver.
2. Id.
'. CAL. CONST. art. 1, §§ 11, 21.
4. .TJS. CoNST. amend. XIV.
5. 2 HARPER & JAMES, The Law of Torts, § 16.15 at 950 (1956).
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"guest statutes."6 These statutes provided that a gratuitous auto-
mobile passenger could not recover damages from the host or owner
for the negligent operation of the automobile unless it had been oper-
ated with gross negligence, or wanton and willful misconduct.7 In
1927, Connecticut became the first state to pass a guest statute.8
Today twenty-seven states have statutes limiting the liability of the
owner or operator of a motor vehicle to a guest.9 Two states,
Massachusetts and Georgia, have imposed similar restrictions by
judicial decision.10 However, no guest statutes have been enacted
since 193911 and several have been repealed, '2 which seems to indi-
cate that these statutes were the product of a particular era and
are no longer needed.
In Brown v. Merlo,13 the California Supreme Court was presented
with the contention that the guest statute was an unconstitutional
denial of equal protection of the law. To make its determination,
the court evaluated the rationality of the classification scheme
in light of the purposes of the legislation. No prior court had
ever adjudicated this precise constitutional claim.1"
The defendant presented two justifications for the guest statute:
(1) the protection of hospitality and (2) the elimination of collusive
lawsuits. In its analysis, the court used the "rational relation"
test.1 6 The court recognized that the United States Supreme Court
6. Tipton, Florida's Automobile Guest Statute, 11 U. FL.A. L. REv. 287 (1958). The pas-
sage of the guest statutes was promoted by the lobbying of liability insurance companies,
who claimed that the statutes were needed: (1) for the protection of hospitality and (2)
for the prevention of collusive suits. Note, The Case Against the Guest Statute, 7 Wm. &
MAY L. Rxv. 821 (1966) ; See generally 2 HARPER & JAmEs, The Law of Torts, § 16.15, at
950-51 (1956).
-7 Note, The Case Against the Guest Statute, 7 Wm. & MARY L. Rxv. 321 (1966). See
also 5A Ax. JuR. Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 511 (1956). The exact language
varies. For a summary of the criteria for each state statute see Comment, Judicial Nullifi-
cation of Guest Statutes, 41 S. CAL. L. Rzv. 884, 899 (1968).
8. Tipton, Florida's Automobile Guest Statute, 11 U. FA. L. REv. 287, 288 n. 7 (1958).
9. See e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-913, 915 (1947) ; CoLo. REV. STAT. AxN. § 13-9-1
(1963) ; DEL. CoDE A.NN. tit. 21, 6101 (1953).
10. Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 119 N.E. 168 (1917), which analogizes to the
liability of a gratuitous bailee. Hennon v. Harden, 78 Ga. App. 81, 50 S.E.2d 236 (1948);
Epps v. Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 399, 106 S.E. 297 (1921).New Jersey formerly held the driver only to the standard of care owed to a licensee.
Lutvin v. Dovkus, 94 N.J.L. 64, 108 A.2d 862 (1920). New Jersey has since adopted the ordi-
nary care standard. Cohen v. Kaminetsky, 36 N.J. 276, 176 A.2d 483 (1961).
11. Tipton, Florida's Automobile Guest Statute, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 287, 288 (1958).
12. After ten years, Connecticut repeaeld its guest statute. CoxN. LAws ch. 270, §
351(d) (1937).
13. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 8d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
14. The validity of the guest statute has been premised on a 1929 decision of the Supreme
Court, Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929). In Silver, however, the basis of the constitu-
tional attack was that the distinction drawn between automobile guests and guests in other
conveyances was a denial of equal protection, whereas in the instant case the attack was
on the two additional statutory distinctions between "guests" and paying passengers and
between different categories of automobile guests. Therefore, the court in Brown v. Merlo
held that the decision in Silver did not control the Instant case. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d
865, 863 n. 4, 506 P.2d 212, 217 n. 4, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 393 n. 4 (1973).
15. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 858, 506 P.2d 212, 214, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 390 (1973).
16. Id. at 861, 506 P.2d at 216, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and. substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.'
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has retreated from a position of absolute deference to the legislature
and required that statutory classification bear a fair and rational
relation to the object of the legislation."T The court noted that
Professor Gerald Gunther has examined this approach and concluded
that recent Sutpreme Court decisions suggest a "new bite" for
the old equal protection."8
The question presented was whether either justification consti-
tuted a rational basis for the differential treatment accorded by
the statute's tripartite classification scheme. The Court noted that
the statute established three distinct levels of classification: first,
"guests" as opposed to "paying" automobile passengers; second,
automobile guests as opposed to other recipients of "generosity";
and third, guests injured while "in a vehicle" "during a ride" "upon
a public highway" as opposed to guests injured in other circum-
stances. 19
The court initially examined the "hospitality" justification and
discovered a number of fatal defects. First, the court found no
realistic state purpose to support the distinction between automobile
guests and other guests or recipients of generosity. 20 Second, the
hospitality justification provided no rational basis for wholly with-
drawing from automobile guests protection against negligent injury."1
Finally, the court found that the development of widespread liability
insurance coverage had eroded any rational connection between
the protection of hospitality and prevention of suits.22 For these
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 446-47 (1972) ; Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 1641 (1972).
17. Id. at 865 n. 7, 506 P.2d at 219 n. 7, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 395 n. 7.
18. Id., citing Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. RLv. 1 (1972).
19. Id. at 863, 506 P.2d at 217, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
20. California's general state policy declares: "Every one is responsible, not only for the
result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of
ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person . . ." CAL. Cry. CODE
§§ 1714, 2096 (West 1960). See also Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561.
70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). In light of this underlying legal principle, the California Supreme
Court held, "persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law
[do not] receive like treatment." Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 866, 506 P.2d 212, 220,
106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 396 (1973), quoting Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State of California, 71 Cal.
2d 566, 578, 456 P.2d 645, 653, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 85 (1969).
21. The California Supreme Court declared that the guest statute was unconstitutional
insofar as it removed a passenger's protection from negligently inflicted injury simply be-
cause he was a non-paying guest. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 866, 506 P.2d 212, 220, 106
Cal. Rptr. 388, 396 (1978), citing Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968)
(Harlan dissenting). See also Stevens v. Stevens, 355 Mich. 363, 369-70, 94 N.W.2d 858,
862 (1959) ; Coren v. Kaminetskky, 36 N.J. 276, 283, 176 A.2d 483, 487 (1961).
22. In the late 1920's automobile liability insurance was the exception rather than the
rule and the statute might have relieved generous hosts from great personal expense.
Elsbree & Roberts, Compulsory Insurance Against Motor Vehicle Accidents, 76 U. PA. L.
R-m. 690, 691 (1928). However, in light of the prevalence of liability insurance today, this
explanation is no longer applicable. See McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 15
Wis. 2d 374, 388 113 N.W.2d 14, 19 (1962).
Also in light of recent developments in comparable legal doctrine it is irrational to
assume that the cause of hospitality will be harmed if a recipient of generosity is per-
mitted to recover negligently caused injuries. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443
P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968); Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951)
Silva v. Providence Hospital, 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P.2d 798 (1939),
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reasons, the court rules that the hospitality justification was in-
adequate.
23
The court then turned to the second proposed justification for
the statute, the prevention of collusive lawsuits against insurance
companies. 24 The court noted that over the past two decades it had
decided a series of cases that had rejected just such a justification
for even narrower classification schemes.25 The court found that
the guest statute presented an overinclusive classification scheme: 26
the statute failed to provide like treatment for similarly situated
individuals by reaching out beyond those persons who actually in-
stitute collusive suits and burdening honest automobile guests. Thus
the court also rejected the prevention of collusive suits justification.
Finally, the court analyzed the statutory exceptions in the guest
statute. A guest's burden of proof depends on whether or not the
journey has come to a momentary halt, whether the guest was
physically located inside or outside the car and whether the car
was on a public highway or on private land.27 These exceptions
have caused confusion and inequality in their application. 28 None
of these exceptions bears any rational relation to the purposes
of the guest statute-the protection of hospitality or prevention
of collusive lawsuits.2 9 In light of all these circumstances, the court
concluded that the guest statute did not withstand the governing
constitutional test-whether a statute's classification bears a rational
relation to a legitimate state interest. 80
The North Dakota guest statute8' has regularly been the subject
23. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 872, 506 P.2d 212, 224, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 400 (1973).
24. Id. at 873, 506 P.2d at 224, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
25. See Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) ; Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal.
2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d
648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971). These three cases deal with the entire range of' intrafamilial
immunities.
26. A statutes classification scheme is overinclusive if it "imposes a burden! upon a wider
range of individuals than are included in the class of those tainted with the mischief at
which the law aims." Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 87 CAL.
L. REV. 341, 351 (1949).
27. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. Od 855, 506 P.2d 212, 229, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 405 (1973).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 880, 506 P.2d at 230, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
30. Id. at 882, 506 P.2d at 231, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 407; See also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).
31. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-15-01 to -03 (1972).
'Guest' shall mean and include a person who accepts a ride in any vehicle
without giving compensation therefor.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-15-01 (1972).
Any person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle moving upon any
of the public highways of this state, and who while so riding as such guest re-
ceives or sustains an injury, shall have no right of recovery against the owner
or driver or person responsible for the operation of such vehicle. In the event
that such person while so riding as such guest is killed or dies as the result
of an injury sustained while so riding as such guest, then neither the estate nor
the legal representatives nor heirs of such guest shall have any right of recovery
against the driver or owner of such vehicle by reason of the death of such guest.
If such person so riding as a guest is a minor and sustains an injury Or Is killed
or dies as a result of Injury sustained while so riding as such guest, then the
parents, guardian, estate, legal representatives, and heirs of such minor shall
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of appeal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota. 2 These cases
have questioned the interpretation and application of the statute. 83
Until recently, none had challenged its constitutionality. That ques-
tion, however, was finally presented in Johnson v. Hassett. 84 In
that case, the District Court for the Second Judicial District of
North Dakota held that the North Dakota guest statute was violative
of the equal protection guarantees of the North Dakota 3 and United
States Constitutions.8 The court relied primarily on Brown v. Merlo.
7
The court recognized the similarity between the wording of the Cali-
fornia Constitution" and the North Dakota Constitution.-"
However, it is also noteworthy that the wording of California's
general state policy in respect to responsibility for willful acts and
negligence, embodied in the Civil Code section 1714,40 is worded
exactly the same as North Dakota's general state policy, embodied
in North Dakota Century Code section 9-10-06:
Everyone is responsible not only for the result of his willful
acts but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want
of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property
or person .... 41
In Brown v. Merlo, the court noted that, "[giiven this underlying
legal principle,4 2  'the fact that the guest pays nothing for riding
have no right of recovery against the driver Or owner or person responsible for
the operation of said vehicle for injury sustained or as a result of death of such
minor.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-15-02 (1972).
The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed as relieving the owner,
driver, or person responsible for the operation of a vehicle from liability for in-
jury to or death of a guest proximately resulting from the intoxication, willful
misconduct, or gross negligence of such owner, driver, or person responsible for
the operation of such vehicle. In any action for death or for injury or damage to
person or property by or on behalf of a guest or the estate, heirs, or legal; repre-
sentatives of such guest, the burden shall be upon the plaintiff to establish that
such intoxication, willful misconduct, or gross negligence was the proximate
cause of such death, injury, or damage.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-15-03 (1972).
32. See Rubbelke v. Jacobsen, 66 N.D. 720, 268 N.W. 675 (1936) ; Stockfeld v. Sayre, 69
N.D. 42, 283 N.W. 788 (1939) ;Degenstein v. Ehrman, 145 N.W.2d 493 (N.D. 1966);
Thornburg v. Perleberg, 158 N.W.2d 188 (N.D. 1968) ; BJerke v. Heartso, 183 N.W.2d 496
(N.D. 1971).
33. For a brief summary of North Dakota's guest statute or those states which have
guest statutes or the equivalent by court decision, together with an analysis of court de-
cisions interpreting (1) who is a guest? (2) what is required to impose liability on the
owner or driver? and (3) the guest's conduct as a defense avoidable to owner or driver,
see Morrison, Auto Guest Laws Today, 27 INS. COUNSEL J. 223 (1960).
34. Johnson v. Hassett, No. 138A (Ramsey County, N.D., Aug. 2, 1973), appeal docketed,
No. 8968, N.D. Sup. Ct., Oct. 18, 1973, where defendant drove his car Into the ditch caus-
ing serious Injury to the plaintiffs, and the jury found defendant negligent and returned
verdicts for plaintiffs from which defendant appealed on the theory of the guest statute.
35. Johnson v. HIassett, No. 138A (Ramsey County, N.D., Aug. 2, 1973), avpeal docketed,
No. 8968, N.D. Sup. Ct., Oct. 18, 1973, citing N.D. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 20.
86. Id., citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
37. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
88. CAL. CONST. art. 1, §§ 11, 21.
39. N.D. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 20.
40. CAJ CIrV. CODE § 1714 (West Supp. 1973).
41. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-06 (Supp 1973).
42. CAL Crv. CODE § 1714 (West Supp. 1978).
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with the owner furnishes no reason why the negligence of the latter
should be excused.' "4s Therefore, Johnson v. Hassett," relying
on the rationale of Brown v. Merlo,45 should be viewed as a prece-
dent-setting ruling by other courts in North Dakota.
The purposes of the guest statutes were to prevent "the pro-
verbial ingratitude of the dog that bites the hand that feeds him,"46
and to prevent collusive suits. However, the statutes go much fur-
ther. Recovery under these statutes is denied in every case where
the passenger is a gratuitous guest and the defendant is guilty
only of negligence. As a result, many claims where no collusion
is attempted or no ingratitude is shown are forbidden in their incep-
tion, and the burden of loss is shifted to the one who is less able
to withstand it. Furthermore, the courts had difficulty in applying
the statutes and as a result every state has a unique statute buried
in confused case law.4 7 The courts have also had problems harmon-
izing the provisions of the guest statutes and the common law, since
our law has long held that one who undertakes to act must act
with a due regard for the safety of others. The value that our people
place on human life and safety is clear. The ruling in the instant
case is important precedent for the abolition of the guest statute
which can no longer be justified either legally or socially.
MARY MUEHLEN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PUBLIC SCHOOLS-A' CHALLENGE TO PREFEREN-
TIAL MINORITY ADMISSIONS
Petitioner was denied admission to the first-year class at the
University of Washington School of Law.' He alleged that lesser
qualified minority students were admitted to the class as a result
43. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 867, 506 P.2d 212, 220, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 396 (1973),
quoting Hewlett v. Schadel, 68 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1934).
44. Johnson v. Hassett, No. 138A (Ramsey County, N.D., Aug. 2, 1978), appeal docketed,
No. 8968, N.D. Sup. Ct., Oct. 18, 1973.
45. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
46. Crawford v. Foster, 110 Cal. App. 2d 81, 87, 293 P. 841, 843 (1930).
47. Among the various problems confronting the courts are: Can an owner be a guest
in his own car if someone else is driving? What if a child is not old enough to know that
he is a guest? What about a guest who wants to get out of a car but is not allowed to
do so? Is a guest who is injured a moment after he leaves the car still a "guest"? The
problems appear endless.
1. The Court found that, on the facts presented, petitioner had standing to sue. Although
there was no way of telling whether petitioner would have been admitted to the class re-
gardless of the number of minority students accepted, his interest constituted the requisite
"personal stake . . . to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely tdepends for illumination of difficult. constitutional
questions." DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169, 1177 (1973), quoting Baker
v. Carr, 396 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) ; accord. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 88, 99 (1968).
